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Banking and real estate have always had an uneasy relationship. It
was not until early this century that national banks were even permitted
to extend loans collateralized by real estate. To this day, national banks,
bank holding companies, and many state-chartered banks are prohib-
ited from owning real estate directly, except when obtained through
foreclosure or if used for bank premises.~ In addition, savings and loan
institutions generally have had authority to make commercial real estate
loans and to invest in real estate directly for only a little more than a
decade.
The uneasy attitude toward bank involvement in real estate lending
is not difficult to understand. Real estate lending has played a significant
role in several of the major episodes of banking difficulties in the
postwar era: in particular, in the mid 1970s through bank-established
"real estate investment trusts" or REITs; in the mid 1980s among banks
and savings and loans in the Southwest; and more recently among
banks in the Northeast and (thus far to a lesser extent) in California.
This paper will attempt to answer four key questions that the most
recent real estate troubles have provoked. First, could the problems that
banks in particular have suffered have been prevented or significantly
minimized in any way by reasonably prudent regulation in advance?
Second, did regulators actually make the problems worse once they
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were discovered? Third, what changes in regulatory policy toward bank
involvement in real estate activities would best prevent real estate
downturns from causing troubles in the banking industry in the future?
And finally, how should those changes be phased in, to ease the
transition out of the current difficulties?
The paper focuses principally on lending for commercial real estate,
not because residential real estate lending is unimportant--to the
contrary, it has been and continues to be larger in volume than
commercial real estate lending--but instead because most of the real-
estate-related problems that banks have experienced have been concen-
trated in commercial projects. In addition, the discussion concentrates
heavily on bank lending for commercial real estate, although virtually all
of the analysis and policy recommendations apply with equal force to
such lending by savings and loans.
In brief, the long-run recommendations are centered on the well-
known observation that commercial real estate activity and values
appear to be heavily influenced by the availability of financing, or
liquidity. When times are good and money is available, lenders lend and
builders build. But because of the long lags between the times loans are
made and projects finished, both developers and banks will eventually
overexpand, leading to excess capacity and thus creating the conditions
for a subsequent contraction.
A central objective for bank regulation (and for policymaking
generally) is to construct a statutory and regulatory environment that
minimizes the amplitude of this inherent "boom and bust" cycle in
commercial real estate. During the up side of the cycle this means that,
at a minimum, lenders should be held to prudent loan-to-value require-
ments, such as those recently proposed by federal bank regulators.
Some have suggested that statutory or regulatory ceilings also be
imposed on the portions of a lender’s assets that can be invested in
commercial real estate lending (mortgages as well as construction and
development loans). This study recommends incentives to encourage
banks not to concentrate so heavily in commercial real estate, rather
than the imposition of arbitrary limits on participation.
Ultimately, the best protection against excessive risk-taking in
commercial real estate or any other bank activity is a regulatory system
that imposes effective discipline generally. The "early intervention"
capital-based requirements of the 1991 banking reform legislation are a
step in the right direction, but more can and should be done to introduce
market discipline, with respect to larger banks in particular. Toward this
end, all banks with assets over $1 billion should be required to satisfy
some portion of their Tier 2 capital standard with subordinated debt,
which would provide a stable source of market discipline against
excessive concentration in high-risk real estate lending. Smaller banks
could be penalized in a different way for excessive concentration,BANKS AND REAL ESTATE: REGULATING THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE 189
preferably with lower supervisory ratings and thus higher deposit
insurance premia, or alternatively through supplemental capital require-
ments.
The more difficult regulatory questions arise when asset values
"turn south," posing the critical issue of whether the policies desirable
for the long run should be relaxed in any way in the short run. Critics of
recent bank regulatory policies argue that they should, pointing to what
they believe has been the contractionary effect of those policies. The
discussion that follows accepts the premise of the critics, that bank
regulation does appear to have worsened the 1990-91 downturn and
inhibited the recovery, but it does not agree with their conclusion that
bank regulation should necessarily be weakened. Instead, the contrac-
tionary effects induced by recent bank regulatory policies mean that the
two traditional macroeconomic policy tools--monetary and fiscal--need
to work that much harder to achieve the desired stimulative impact.
Thus, at this writing, a strong case continues for further monetary
easing and possibly even some short-run fiscal stimulus, provided that
any fiscal package contain concrete measures to reduce the high-
employment or structural federal deficit in the long run.
This study nevertheless will recommend three ways in which bank
regulation might be changed to minimize the contractionary effects that
have been the focus of the critics’ attack and yet be consistent with
desirable long-run regulatory objectives. First, and admittedly most
difficult to alter given their internationally negotiated character, the
risk-based bank capital standards should be reworked to remove much
of their current bias against banks’ making loans. At the very least, a
waiver procedure could be established to permit individual countries to
narrow the risk-weighting differential between government securities
and conventional loans, provided the overall level of capital required of
banks is not reduced. In this way the actual 4 percent and 8 percent
capital standards for Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital would not be reduced or
even delayed. Second, regulators should abandon the policy of requir-
ing banks to establish loss reserves on so-called "performing nonper-
forming loans," those loans where the borrower continues to make
payments but, in the opinion of the regulators, the short-run liquidation
value of the collateral has fallen below the face amount of the loan.
Instead, banks should be required to establish reserves on loans only
when they become nonperforming, not when they are expected to be in
that status. Third, once loans become nonperforming, regulators should
be discouraged from using liquidation values to establish reserve levels,
but instead should base their reserving decisions on conservative, but
realistic, estimates of the present discounted value of the real estate
collateral.
Some may interpret any or all of these recommendations as a
"relaxation" of current standards, but all three can be justified with190 Robert E. Litan
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appeals to simple common sense. Moreover, to do otherwise in the
name of regulatory purity can actually be self-defeating, encouraging a
spiral downward in real estate values and bank capital that can only
further weaken many of the loans banks already have on their books.
Put another way, these changes are designed to be permanent features
of the regulatory landscape that nevertheless take account of inevitable
cyclical fluctuations in the macroeconomy. Bank regulatory policy itself
should not be cyclical.
Finally, key to any economic recovery is the growth of residential
construction. It is therefore critical that bank regulatory policies not
discourage the financing of residential construction by banks and thrift
institutions.
Banks and Real Estate Lending:
Some Factual Background
As other papers in this volume document, commercial banks
became substantially more involved in real estate lending during the
1980s. Figure 1 illustrates, however, that the major upturn did not reallyBANKS AND REAL ESTATE: REGULATING THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE 191
begin until the middle of the decade, and then it did not really accelerate
until the end of the decade. At the end of the first quarter of 1992, banks
had $854 billion in real estate loans on their books, representing
one-quarter of their assets and 43 percent of their total loans.
Figure 2 charts real estate lending for banks of different sizes by
major loan category-~construction and development, nonfarm, nonres-
idential mortgages (commercial mortgages), and residential mortgages
(one- to four-family). The figures illustrate that banks of all sizes became
more active real estate lenders during the past several years, although
some distinctions are notable. In contrast to their larger brethren, the
smallest banks (those with assets below $300 million) did not signifi-
cantly increase their lending for construction and development, and
thus did not have to cut it back significantly at the end of the decade, as
did the larger banks.
It is not difficult to explain why larger banks were increasingly
attracted to real estate--and especially commercial real estate lending--
during the past decade. These institutions suffered a loss of their prime
commercial and industrial loan customers, who found cheaper finance
in the securities markets, but they did not suffer a loss in deposits.
Accordingly, many large banks chased various forms of higher-risk
lending, largely for commercial real estate but also for highly leveraged
corporate transactions.2
More puzzling, however, is the fact that even banks that had never
loaned money to the large companies that deserted banks for the
securities markets during the 1980s plunged more heavily into commer-
cial real estate lending. As will be argued below, this was likely a
reflection of the herd mentality that gripped many investors, foreign
and domestic, bank and nonbank, in the 1980s. At the same time, it is
noteworthy that the very smallest banks (those below $300 million in
assets), which would have been least affected by the "securitization" of
commercial lending in the 1980s, moved less aggressively into commer-
cial real estate lending than the medium-sized and larger banks.
Meanwhile, the rise in the share of all bank assets devoted to less
risky residential real estate mortgages can be attributed largely to two
factors. Among other things, the 1986 Tax Reform Act gradually phased
out deductions for consumer installment debt and thus encouraged
consumers to replace what were once straight consumer loans with
home equity loans, which are included in the data for residential real
estate lending shown in Figure 2. In addition, in the latter part of the
decade, bank regulators from the major industrialized countries agreed
upon new capital standards (the so-called "Basle Accord") that gave
banks incentives to originate and hold residential mortgages, by requir-
2 This phenomenon is addressed in some detail in Litan (1991).192 Robert E. Litan
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Table 1
Percentage of Bank Commercial Real Estate Loans in Nonaccrual Status, First
Quarter 1991 vs. First Quarter 1992
Construction and Commercial
Development Loans Mortgages All Loans
Asset Size                 1991:1 1992:1 1991:1 1992:1 1991:t 1992:1
All Banks 11.9 14,8 5.5 5.9 3.2 3.0
Less than $100 Million 2.8 3.2 2.1 2.5 1.8 1.6
$100 Million to $1 Billion 5.2 5.8 2.6 3,4 2.1 2.1
$1 Billion to $10 Billion 11.1 12.2 5.3 5.5 3.1 2.8
Over $10 Billion 16.7 22.4 10.0 10.5 4.2 4.0
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Research and Statistics. The FDIC Quarterly
Banking Profile. First Quarter 1991, p. 3; and First Quarter 1992, p. 3.
ing them to back each dollar so invested with only half the capital
required for conventional loans. Although the standards did not become
effective until 1991, the fact that they were announced in 1988 would
have given banks incentives to build up their residential mortgage
portfolios in advance.
It is now well known, of course, that in the 1990s banks have paid
a heavy price for their plunge into commercial real estate during the
preceding decade. As shown in Table 1, by the first quarter of 1992,
nearly 15 percent of all construction and development loans made by
U.S. banks were in nonaccrual status, while almost 6 percent of all
banks’ commercial mortgage loans were in a similar condition. Both
numbers were several multiples of the nonaccrual percentages for bank
loans generally, and both were higher in the first quarter of 1992 than in
the same period the prior year, while bank loans generally were
improving in quality. In addition, the largest banks reported the highest
percentages of commercial real estate loans in nonaccrual status, con-
sistent with the observation just made that these institutions suffered
the greatest shock to their traditional lending business in the 1980s and
thus took the greatest risks in an effort to compensate.
Thus far, banks’ losses in commercial real estate have not exceeded
their losses from LDC debt, either in absolute or relative terms. For
example, from 1987 through 1991, the top 50 U.S. banks wrote off $26
billion, or approximately one-quarter of their LDC debt. In contrast,
between 1989 and 1991 (the years covering the recent commercial real
estate crisis) all U.S. banks wrote off $18 billion, or only about 5 percent,
of their commercial real estate loans (Lipin 1992). But it is far too soon to
close the books on the comparison. A Goldman Sachs study reported in
mid 1992 that $93 billion in bank loans for commercial real estate had still
to be "’repriced"--or less euphemistically, written down--in order to
reflect a projected average deterioration of 30 percent in the value of theBANKS AND REAL ESTATE: REGULATING THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE 195
underlying real estate.3 If, quite conservatively, the write-downs aver-
age 20 percent, then the banking industry as a whole is looking at total
additional losses of almost $19 billion, a sum roughly equal to the entire
earnings of the banking industry in 1991 (approximately $18 billion).
Bank Real Estate Lending: The Role of Public Policy
Banks clearly took a roller coaster ride in their commercial real estate
investments during the 1980s and have only themselves to blame for
their mistakes. Nevertheless, public policy helped in various ways to
build the roller coaster.
The role played by changes in tax policy is well known. The 1981
Economic Recovery Tax Act helped launch a wave of development
activity by granting generous depreciation allowances and other incen-
tives for commercial real estate development. But then the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 pulled the plug on the market by abruptly taking those
incentives away. The changes in tax policy are reflected in the statistics:
between 1981 and 1985, the nominal value of commercial construction
put in place almost doubled, rising from $40 billion to $76 billion; it was
virtually flat thereafter until mid 1990, when it began to plummet on
account of the recession.4
Bank regulatory policy followed a similar roller coaster pattern. As
part of the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982, Congress removed various
statutory restrictions on permissible loan-to-value ratios governing the
real estate lending of national banks, which previously ranged from 66.7
percent for unimproved land to 90 percent for improved structures,s In
their place, Congress issued only broad instructions to the Comptroller
of the Currency to regulate real estate loans in a manner consistent with
the "safety and soundness" principles it applied to all bank lending. A
gradual relaxation of lending standards throughout much of the banking
system followed.
For example, at the beginning of the decade the typical bank did not
finance unimproved land; when it financed construction it did so only
when a developer had a commitment for "takeout" financing in hand;
and commercial mortgages were provided only where developers put
up at least 30 percent of the money. By the end of the decade, land loans
3 Brueggman (1992). The study also indicated that at that time thrift institutions and
insurance companies faced repricing on $92 billion of commercial mortgages.
4 Data are from the Economic Report of the President, 1992, pp. 354--55. For a thorough
treatment of the role played by tax policy changes, see the paper by James Poterba in this
volume.
5 The previous law also specified loan-to-value limits and maturities for residential
mortgage loans of 80 to 90 percent.196 Robert E. Litan
were common, construction loans often were provided without advance
takeout commitments, and many developers put up as little as 10
percent equity. In some cases, banks put up all the money (Brimmer
1992; Downs 1992). In this respect, banks followed the thrifts, which
were allowed into commercial real estate finance for the first time only
at the beginning of the 1980s (with the passage of the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act in 1980 and the
Garn-St Germain Act in 1982). Liberal commercial real estate lending by
many thrifts helped lead to the overbuilding in many markets that later
came to haunt the commercial banks and the developers they funded.
The roller coaster in bank and thrift regulatory policy changed
direction at the very end of the 1980s in two ways. First, lending by
thrifts for both commercial real estate and residential construction was
significantly cut back in August 1989 in the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). This was not done
directly, but instead was the effective result of provisions that forced
thrifts to limit loans to one borrower to no more than 15 percent of
capital (the standard applicable to banks), down sharply from the
previous 100 percent of capital limit. As a practical matter, this change
had its greatest impact on commercial real estate loans, which tended to
be the largest loans in thrift portfolios. In addition, FIRREA mandated a
long overdue increase in thrift capital ratios that had the effect of
constraining the growth of capital-weak institutions.
Second, shortly after FIRREA became law, bank regulators became
more rigorous in their valuation of loans collateralized with real estate
and then of commercial loans generally. The change in attitude appears
to have surfaced first with the Comptroller’s examination of Bank of
New England, which had a large portion (38 percent) of its loan portfolio
tied up in real estate, primarily in the Northeast where real estate values
had begun to drop. As a result of the exam, Bank of New England was
required to make substantial additions to its reserves in the fourth
quarter of 1989 and even greater additions the following year (culminat-
ing in the bank’s failure in January 1991).
The regulatory posture became more formal and general in early
1990, mandating a more conservative approach toward establishing
reserves for future loan losses and in particular requiring banks and
their examiners to place greater emphasis on the market value of the
underlying collateral, as an indicator of the likelihood of future default.
For commercial real estate loans in particular, the Comptroller issued
new instructions that noted, among other things, that "[m]ortgaged
premises can be considered foreclosed, in substance, regardless of
whether formal foreclosure has taken place . . . when the debtor has
little to no equity in the collateral, sources of repayment depend on the
operation or sale of the collateral, and the debtor has abandoned control
of the collateral" (emphasis added). The new guidelines further ob-BANKS AND REAL ESTATE: REGULATING THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE 197
served that while "in some cases" the debtor may continue to retain
control of the collateral, as a practical matter control may be deemed
abandoned "because of financial weakness or [poor] economic pros-
pects."6
In effect, this language gave examiners the authority to require
banks to establish reserves against loans on which borrowers were
current in their payments but where the market value of the underlying
real estate collateral had fallen so low as to wipe out any equity the
borrower may once have had in the project. In fact, examiners had this
authority before, since the Comptroller’s Handbook had previously coun~
seled that mortgage loans were unsound if "the amount of the loan is
large relative to the fair value of the property" or if the "ability of the
obligor to pay is questionable" (Section 213.1, p. 2). In this connection,
the Handbook had also observed that real estate values could be deter-
mined by looking to the recent prices on comparable real estate or by
capitalizing income that the property was expected to generate. All of
this preexisting language gave examiners ample flexibility to force banks
to establish reserves on what have since been labeled "in substance
foreclosures." Nevertheless, by adding specific instructions to this
effect, the new guidelines issued in early 1990 appeared to dictate that
approach, rather than allowing banks to avoid reserving until borrowers
actually began missing their loan payments.7 It appears that the other
federal bank regulatory agencies--the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration and the Federal Reserve--adopted the Comptroller’s new
policy at roughly the same time.
The widely understood rationale for the tough regulatory stance
toward the valuation of bank real estate loans was a desire to make
provision in advance for the increased likelihood that in a depressed real
estate market, borrowers would simply "hand the keys" to their
property to the bank rather than continue to make loan payments, even
if they had the financial resources to make those payments independent
of the collateral. Such behavior apparently was common in the South-
west in the mid 1980s, when plunging oil prices caused an economic
downturn in that regional economy. Regulators simply wanted to apply
that experience to New England and any other part of the country where
it seemed likely to be repeated. A critical question, to be addressed
~ Taken from the Comptroller’s Handbook for National Bank Examiners (March 1990),
Section 213.1, p. 2.
7 Much has been made of the fact that the Comptroller’s new policy urged examiners
to value property based on "discounted cash flow" techniques. It is true that the new
instructions specifically described discounted cash flow as an alternative real estate
valuation technique, but no major conceptual difference exists between discounted cash
flow and the "capitalization of income" approach that was previously identified as a
method of valuation.198 Robert E. Litan
below, is whether in attempting to anticipate future loan losses, regu-
lators helped make them worse.
Bank Real Estate Problems: Could They Have
Been Avoided?
It is easy in retrospect to claim that regulators could have done a
better job of preventing banks from taking the real estate roller coaster.
At a minimum, if both bank and thrift regulators had retained in the
form of regulation the loan-to-value ratios that were previously part of
the bank statutory environment, both types of depository institutions
would not have so freely increased their exposures to commercial real
estate. The same would be true, of course, if Congress had never
repealed the loan-to-value guidelines as part of Garn-St Germain.
A case can also be made that real estate concentration limits would
have helped, although as will be argued below, less arbitrary ways can
be found to curtail excessive real estate lending risks. In fact, even
Garn-St Germain constrained federally chartered thrifts in their com-
mercial real estate lending, although the "limit" was quite high~40
percent of assets, or more than four times the average level of the typical
bank during the 1980s. No such concentration limit was set for commer-
cial banks. Clearly, in retrospect, had both sets of institutions been
subjected to significantly lower limits--say, on the order of 10 percent--
commercial real estate construction would not have gone as far over-
board as it did. Moreover, a 10 percent concentration limit would have
constrained fewer than 10 percent of the banks.8
But just because different regulatory policies could have prevented
overlending by banks for commercial real estate, overall bank safety
would not necessarily have been enhanced. After all, if banks and thrifts
had not made commercial real estate loans that later turned sour, they
still would have had to find some other investments for the deposits
they had collected. Since by making these loans in the first place these
institutions had displayed an appetite for risk-taking, would they not
simply have found other, perhaps even riskier, ways to gamble---for
example, by extending even riskier commercial and consumer loans,
engaging more heavily in trading activities (government securities and
foreign exchange), or taking on more interest rate risk? Or, if their
risk-taking opportunities in commercial real estate lending had been
truly diminished, would they have pursued their other banking activi-
ties more prudently?
This calculation is based on data from Bank Source, a data base service of W.C.
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To oversimplify, the answers to these questions turn on which view
of the commercial real estate lending phenomenon most accurately
describes the behavior of lending institutions during the 1980s. The
"moral hazard" view suggests that risk-taking was concentrated among
institutions that were poorly capitalized or perhaps even economically
insolvent, or those institutions that, in principle, would have had the
most to gain from the "heads I win, tails the FDIC/FSLIC loses" gambles
that are created by federal deposit insurance. If this view is correct, then
tighter loan-to-value criteria or lending concentration limits for commer-
cial real estate lending would have helped contain the overbuilding of
commercial properties, but would not have stopped the lending insti-
tutions from taking other, potentially even riskier gambles.
An alternative view would suggest that it was a "herd" or "lem-
ming" mentality that drove banks and thrifts into such heavy involve-
ment in commercial real estate lending. That is, once some lenders saw
how profitable such lending was for other lenders, they quickly hopped
on the bandwagon, hoping either that the real estate boom would last
forever or, more likely, that at least their borrowers would be the last
good ones before the crash came. Moreover, what made commercial real
estate lending so easy is that lenders did not have to go out chasing
deals. The 1981 tax act gave developers strong incentives to cook up
deals, which then came to the banks, and all the banks had to do was
decide whether to take them. If the "lemming" view of bank and thrift
lending for commercial real estate is correct, then presumably tighter
loan-to-value ratios and/or concentration limits not only would have
constrained risk-taking in commercial real estate, but also would have
enhanced the overall safety of the banking system.
Which of these two views is most accurate? For thrift institutions,
several pieces of evidence tilt toward the moral hazard explanation.
First, between 1982 and 1985, or the three years following the enactment
of Garn-St Germain, the thrift industry as a whole increased its invest-
ments in commercial mortgages from $44 billion to $98 billion, or from
6.4 percent of its assets to 9.2 percent. It was during this period that
much of the asset gambling in the industry took place and quite clearly
commercial mortgages were the chosen vehicle for this risk-taking, since
the share of residential mortgages in thrift portfolios dropped sharply,
from about 73 percent of assets to less than 60 percent (Hendershott and
Kane 1992). Significantly, the thrifts that grew most rapidly--and thus
were likely to have had the thinnest capital-to-asset ratios (assuming
they were positive)--had higher proportions of their assets invested in
commercial mortgages, suggesting that these institutions were deliber-
ately taking risks at the expense of the deposit insurer (White 1991, pp.
102-103).
Second, between 1985 and 1988, thrifts that were insolvent accord-
ing to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) consistently had200 Robert E, Litan
higher proportions of their assets invested in commercial mortgages; the
same pattern was true for direct investments (Barth, Bartholomew, and
Bradley 1989). In some quarters, this pattern has been interpreted as
evidence that commercial mortgage investments "caused" the insolven-
cies. The more accurate interpretation may be that institutions that were
GAAP-insolvent throughout this period abused the deposit insurance
system, taking ever larger risks while they remained open, and that
their vehicle of choice was commercial real estate. Indeed, GAAP-
insolvent thrifts increased the share of assets devoted to commercial real
estate mortgages between 1985 and 1986 from 12.7 percent to 17.2
percent, a trend consistent with this explanation.
Moral hazard behavior also helped drive some of our largest
banks--namely those that had suffered significant losses on LDC debt--
toward commercial real estate lending (Litan 1991, pp. 28--29). But that
surely cannot explain why, as was shown in Figure 2, banks in all size
groups increased the concentration of their portfolios in such invest-
ments. Nor can it explain why so many nonbank financial institutions,
such as life insurance companies and pension funds, also became more
active lenders for real estate (although primarily for the less risky
takeout financing). The "lemming" hypothesis appears to be more
consistent with these actions than moral hazard.
To investigate this issue further, this study analyzed banks of
different capital strengths during the period from 1986 to 1989, the years
when banks sharply increased their investments in commercial real
estate loans, to see if the weaker banks displayed any greater tendency
to increase their asset concentrations in construction and development
and commercial mortgage loans. Banks were segregated for this purpose
into "small" and "large" banks, or those with less and more than $1
billion in assets, respectively.
Table 2 shows the results for the larger banks in two capital-to-asset
categories, above 6 percent and between 3 percent and 6 percent; too
few banks of this size had capital ratios below 3 percent to provide
meaningful results. The contents of the table can best be described with
an example. The first line of the table lists, for all banks with capital
ratios above 6 percent in 1986, the shares of their assets invested in loans
for construction and development, commercial mortgages, and residen-
tial mortgages in the years from 1986 to 1989. For this group of banks,
the best-capitalized institutions, the shares invested in all three types of
real estate rose during the period. The same pattern was repeated for
banks with capital ratios above 6 percent in 1987 and in 1988.
The critical question is whether banks that were less well capital-
ized, those with capital ratios between 3 and 6 percent, displayed any
greater tendency to invest in commercial real estate loans, the behavior
one would expect if moral hazard incentives were driving much of the
investment in this area. The answer appears to be "no": the shares ofBANKS AND REAL ESTATE: REGULATING THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE 201
Table 2
Percentage of Bank Assets Vested in Real Estate in the Years 1986 to 1989
Banks with Assets Greater than $1 Billion, Grouped by Equity-to-Asset Ratio
Construction and Commercial Residential
Equity- Development Loans Mortgages Mortgages
Year- Asset
End Ratio 1986 1987 1988 1989 1986 1987 1988 1989 1986 1987 1988 1989
1986 >6% 6.9 7,7 8.1 8.0 7.2 8.6 9.5 10.3 11.8 13.0 13.8 14.7
3%-6% 6.3 6.9 6.7 6.6 4.9 5.8 6.2 6.8 7.1 8.4 10.0 12.4
1987 >6% 6.6 6.9 7.1 7.1 8.0 9.7 10.4 11.2 11.3 16.2 17.1 17.6
3%-6% 6.2 7.1 7.4 7.4 5.1 6.7 7.2 7.7 8.9 11,7 13.2 15.4
1988 >6% 6.4 7.0 7.5 7.4 7.8 9.9 10.7 11.4 12.6 17.9 19.2 20.0
3%-6% 5,8 6.4 6.9 6.8 4.6 5.6 6.5 7.0 7.3 9.5 10.8 12.6
Source: W.C. Ferguson & Company, Bank Source.
assets invested by these banks in commercial real estate loans also rose
over the period, but not noticeably faster than among the better
capitalized banks.
Table 3 provides the same statistics for banks with less than $1
billion in assets, with one key difference: for this group of banks, it was
possible to include banks with significantly lower capital ratios, between
zero and 3 percent, where one would expect to find more evidence of
moral hazard behavior. This table, too, shows no strong evidence of
Table 3
Percentage of Bank Assets Vested in Real Estate in the Years 1986 to 1989
Banks with Assets Less than $1 Billion, Grouped by Equity-to-Asset Ratio
Construction and Commercial Residential
Equity- Development Loans Mortgages Mortgages
Year- Asset
End Ratio 1986 1987 1988 1989 1986 1987 1988 1989 1986 1987 1988 1989
1986 >6% 4.3 4.5 4.6 4.8 12.0 13.1 13.7 14.2 20.8 22.6 23.6 24.5
3%-6% 7.7 7.2 6.9 6.8 13.9 15.5 15.4 16.3 16.6 18.8 20.2 21.4
1.5%-3% 7.0 5.6 5.2 4.5 12.5 11.3 12.7 13.3 11.3 12.8 12.1 13.1
0-1.5% 17.9 18.6 13.8 5.9 8,8 15.5 17.6 17.6 14.0 14.7 18.2 19.6
1987 >6% 4.1 4.7 5.0 5.1 11.9 13.0 13.6 14.2 21.2 27.3 28.3 29.1
3%-6% 7.9 7.4 6.2 5.9 13.3 15.2 15.8 16.4 16.7 20.4 22.6 25.2
1.5%-3% 9.0 8.3 7.0 5.2 12.9 17.5 13.3 12.5 13.7 16.6 17.6 26.6
0-1.5% 8.3 5.2 4.2 3.2 14.8 15.0 15.7 13.0 16.5 22.8 31.8 32.6
1988 >6% 4.0 4.6 5.0 5.1 11.9 12.9 13.7 14.3 21.5 27.6 28.7 29.4
3%-6% 6.8 7.0 6.9 6.2 12.2 14.2 14.8 15.4 16,6 20.6 22.4 24.8
1.5%-3% 5.3 5.8 3.4 4.1 11.1 13.1 12.9 14.4 15.2 18.8 19.0 22.0
0-1.5% 9.6 9.4 7.1 3.9 9.5 12.6 14.5 12.4 12.1 16.5 18.4 19.8
Source: W.C. Ferguson & Company, Bank Source.202 Robert E. Litan
such behavior. Indeed, the weakest banks (those with capital-to-asset
ratios below 3 percent) actually decreased the shares of their invest-
ments devoted to commercial real estate by the end of the period,
although this result is strongly affected by "survivorship bias," since a
large fraction of the banks in this category eventually failed.9
The fact that moral hazard behavior was not as evident in the
banking industry as it was among thrifts should not be surprising. After
all, during the mid 1980s, the thrifts that were gambling were actually
insolvent. In contrast, while the capital ratios of many banks were
weak--especially those of the larger banks that had engaged heavily in
LDC debt lending--they were not negative. Thus the incentives for
risk-taking, while present, were not as strong as those that confronted
insolvent thrifts. At the same time, however, moral hazard incentives
probably played some role in the tendency of a number of weak larger
banks to engage more heavily in commercial real estate lending in the
latter part of the decade.
In sum, to the extent that commercial real estate lending increased
among thrifts and banks during the 1980s on account of moral hazard,
it is unlikely that a tougher regulatory policy toward real estate lending
would have improved overall bank and thrift safety, although it clearly
would have resulted in fewer real estate problems. That does not mean,
however, that such a policy would have been totally ineffective. Lem-
ming behavior also appears to have played a significant role in the
willingness of so many lending institutions to increase the shares of
their asset portfolios invested in commercial real estate loans. A more
restrictive regulatory policy toward real estate lending would have
constrained the lemmings from following each other over the cliff.
How then could the moral hazard dangers have been prevented?
With respect to thrifts, the answer is easy: insolvent institutions should
have been shut down, and if the money for that job would not have
been made available (as it was not), then at the very least those
institutions should not have been permitted to grow. With respect to
banks, it would have been desirable to have had in place something like
the capital-based early intervention system of many years ago, so that a
number of the weakly capitalized banks would have been constrained
from bidding for high-cost deposits and placing the proceeds in risky
investments. However, as will be argued below, enhanced regulatory
discipline could and should have been supplemented by non-destabilizing
market discipline, in the form of a mandatory subordinated debt
~ The overwhelming proportion of banks with less than $1 billion in assets actually
had assets below $500 million. Of the banks with capital ratios below 3 percent,
approximately one-half failed during the period from 1987 to 1989. See Barth, Brumbaugh
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requirement for larger institutions. Such a requirement would have
limited the growth of some of the weaker large banks and thus inhibited
their risk-taking.
Did Regulators and Congress Make
the Problem Worse?
As already noted, regulatory and statutory policy related to bank
and thrift financing of real estate turned sharply more restrictive at the
very end of the 1980s. A growing chorus of policymakers--some in
attendance at this conference--believe that regulators overreacted, cre-
ating a vicious downward cycle in real estate prices and in economic
activity generally.
The stylized argument, in summary, goes something like this. By
requiring banks to establish substantial reserves against currently per-
forming loans where the market value of the collateral may have fallen
below the loan amount, regulators induced a significant erosion in the
capital bases of many banks, initially in the Northeast but more recently
in other parts of the country. All this occurred at a time when regulators
were also paying much greater attention to compliance with capital
standards, initially as a result of the Basle Accord and later on account
of the 1991 banking legislation. Accordingly, it is said that banks became
much more reluctant to lend, not only for new real estate projects--
which was appropriate, given the overbuilding in the market but also
to roll over the mini-perm and bullet loans they had previously ex-
tended. This reluctance to lend, in turn, allegedly drove real estate
prices down further, which caused second and third rounds of write-
downs on commercial real estate lending. At the risk of stating the
obvious, the critics do not quarrel with the fact that real estate prices
initially may have fallen, but with the regulatory policy driven in large
part by the market’s valuation (or estimates thereof, based on dis-
counted cash flow models).
If this was the only alleged effect of the tighter regulatory policy
toward commercial real estate, the critics would find few sympathetic
ears beyond those on the heads of real estate developers and lending
officers in the financial institutions that had extended money to them.
But the alleged damage is considerably worse: it is suggested that the
capital erosion induced by the market-based valuation of real estate,
coinciding as it did with tougher capital enforcement generally, caused
banks to contract their overall lending to other sectors of the economy,
thus worsening the economic downturn that began in New England at
the end of the 1980s and elsewhere in 1990. In short, the so-called
"credit crunch" is said to be directly attributable to a combination of the204 Robert E. Litan
Table 4
Portfolio Composition of Insured Commercial Banks
Percentage of Total Assets
Asset 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 4/92
Loans
C&I 19.4 19.1 18.5 17.3 17.7
Consumer 11.3 11.4 11.2 10,8 10.5
Real Estate 20.6 22.2 23,5 24.4 25.1





Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1992,
regulators’ policies toward real estate lending in particular and the
structure and enforcement of capital standards generally.
The evidence is clear that banks have become more reluctant to lend
since 1989. Table 4 shows that the share of banking assets devoted to
securities investments (principally U.S. government bonds) increased
by 3 percentage points between 1989 and April 1992. Indeed, the Federal
Reserve reported in July 1992 that, for the first time in 27 years, total
bank holdings of Treasury securities ($607 billion) had surpassed total
bank commercial and industrial loans ($599 billion). The peculiar struc-
ture of the new capital standards--namely, the risk-weighting of assets
that assigns a zero weight and therefore no capital requirement for U.S.
government securities, as opposed to conventional loans--has only
worsened this problem.1°
In addition, strong evidence suggests that banks have purposefully
curtailed their asset growth, in an effort not only to conform with capital
standards but also to provide a margin of comfort in excess of those
standards. It takes only a brief look at banks’ real estate problems to
understand why. As of the first quarter of 1992, 4.6 percent of all real
estate loans made by all U.S. banks were in "noncurrent" status (past
due by at least 90 days or otherwise in nonaccrual status); since real
estate loans represent one-quarter of all bank assets, the real estate
nonaccruals represent an estimated 1.2 percent of all bank assets. If, in
a reasonable worst case, one-half of the value of the nonaccruals must be
charged off, then the "hit" to bank capital ratios from problems in real
estate lending alone is about 0.6 percentage points. For banks in New
England, where almost 8 percent of all real estate loans were in
10 A number of Federal Reserve officials, including the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board himself, have stated that the "leverage ratio" was becoming more binding
for many banks than the risk-based standards and that, therefore, the regulators were
giving strong consideration to phasing out the leverage standard. Ironically, however, it is
the Basle risk-weighted standards that have given banks especially strong incentives to
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nonaccrual status in the first quarter of 1992, the effects would be twice
as large, or over 1 percent of assets. In New York, where real estate
nonaccruals were over 16 percent of all real estate loans, the impact is
potentially four times as high, or more than 2 percent of assets.11
Given that the minimum bank leverage ratio is 4 percent, and that
banks have losses on other loans as well, it is little wonder that the
potential losses on real estate loans have driven banks to shrink their
assets--principally by letting their high-cost deposits "run off." For
example, total bank assets grew at an annual rate of just 2.8 percent
between December 1989 and April 1992, or less than half the 5.9 percent
growth rate between 1983 and 1989. The sluggish growth of bank assets
during the past several years is consistent, of course, with the concom-
itant slow growth in the monetary aggregates. It also reinforces the
significance of the slowdown in the growth of bank lending.
There are two views, of course, about the source of this slowdown.
Most banks, and quite a few economists, have claimed that bank assets
and loans have not been growing because of a lack of demand for credit.
After all, the economy has been extremely weak and both businesses
and consumers have been overextended, so und6rstandably businesses
have not been eager to borrow from banks, at any price. Indeed, a recent
survey by the National Federation of Independent Business reports loan
demand at an all-time low among companies with 100 employees or less
(Saddler 1992).
On the other hand, when customers fail to show up at a bank, that
does not automatically mean that demand is absent: it only means that
demand is weak at the price suppliers are offering. In the case of the
banking industry, while it is true that the absolute level of the prime rate
has fallen, it has not fallen as rapidly as the cost of funds. For example,
by one measure, the difference between the prime rate and the rate on
fed funds, the "spread" on bank commercial and industrial loans rose to
an historic high in 1991 (Figure 3). And the spread does not include the
other costs of obtaining a bank loan these days, especially the costs
entailed in providing more collateral.
The higher costs in turn may be--and probably are--misperceived
by many borrowers, who may believe that they are so high that they do
not even bother applying for loans (the counterpart of "discouraged
workers"). Too many anecdotes to be ignored, coming from smaller
businesses as well as some bankers, suggest that precisely such factors
have been at work, especially in the Northeast where bank capital has
been hit especially hard by the real estate downturn. Perhaps the most
persuasive of such anecdotal evidence occurred in May 1992, after the
11 Data in this paragraph are taken from The FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile, First
Quarter, 1992.206 Robert E. Litan
Figure 3
The Spread between the Prime Rate
and the Federal Funds Rate
Percentage Points
1
1955 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975    .     1979 1983 1987 1991
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Bank of Boston announced and publicly advertised the fact that it was
making up to $3 billion available for commercial loans. According to a
bank official, the response was literally overwhelming: over 5,000 loan
applications were filed in short order, and while many were not
meritorious, by August 1992 the bank had agreed to provide $1 billion in
new financing to this pool of customers. The fact that other banks in the
New England area do not appear to have been as aggressive as the Bank
of Boston suggests that the credit crunch in that region is very real---and
that it is driven by supply, rather than demand.
Critics of the supply-driven "credit crunch" hypothesis may re-
spond by pointing to the commercial paper market, where the most
creditworthy companies that do not rely on banks for credit have
curtailed their borrowing. For example, after growing at an annual rate
of 21 percent between the end of 1987 and the end of 1990, commercial
paper issued by nonfinancial corporations actually fell by almost 10
percent in 1991. Clearly, if the most creditworthy borrowers in the
United States have cut down on their borrowing, that would suggest
that cries of a credit crunch are overblown and that any drop in
borrowing must be demand-driven instead.
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pointing pace of the economic recovery and the continued spate of
anecdotes about the unwillingness of banks to lend to creditworthy
borrowers. For another thing, nonfinancial companies have resumed
their borrowing through the commercial paper market in 1992, causing
the total outstanding to increase at an annual rate of almost 20 percent
in the first quarter. In contrast, during the same period, total commercial
and industrial lending by commercial banks fell at an annual rate of 7.5
percent, suggesting that smaller businesses were indeed having more
difficulty finding credit than larger borrowers. In any event, the most
creditworthy borrowers, who can access the commercial paper market,
account for only a small proportion of total employment in the economy.
In 1991, for example, the Fortune 500 companies employed only a little
more than 10 percent of all nonfarm workers, down from about 20
percent in the early 1970s (Hale 1992).
Moreover, the fact that corporate borrowers have reduced their
commercial paper borrowings does not necessarily prove that less
creditworthy borrowers who must rely on banks have not been discour-
aged from seeking bank loans by an actual or perceived unwillingness of
banks to lend. What may be going on is a vicious cycle, whereby smaller
companies that both supply and consume the products and services that
are produced and delivered by larger companies have been hurt by the
unavailability of bank financing; the larger corporate customers in turn
need to borrow less because they are producing or delivering less; but all
this does not mean that a credit crunch has not existed for smaller
companies, especially those in hard-hit regions like New England.
The aggregate data confirm that banks have become less important
providers of credit, relative to other financial institutions. Between 1989
and 1991, total credit market funds advanced by all private financial
institutions fell from $536 billion to $337 billion, a 37 percent drop. Over
the same period, the funds supplied by commercial banks fell even
more, by 53 percent (from $177 billion to $83 billion). In contrast,
insurance and pension funds actually increased their supply of funds by
the small margin of 2 percent ($198 billion to $203 billion).12 In short, a
shift of credit flows has most likely occurred among borrowers, from the
smaller businesses that customarily rely on banks to individuals and to
larger corporations that borrow from other financial intermediaries.
Still another possible criticism of the credit crunch hypothesis, at
least as it relates to New England where bank capital ratios have been
reduced the most in recent years, is drawn from the experience in Texas.
In the mid 1980s, banks in that state experienced a similar negative
shock to their capital positions. Yet as one study has shown, economic
activity there has not been correlated with the lagged values of lending
Data are taken from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 1992, p. A41.208 Robert E. Litan
by banks in the state, suggesting that banking difficulties have not had
noticeable negative real consequences (Gunther and Robinson 1991). It
would be a mistake, however, to draw too much from this experience.
As the authors point out, the most likely explanation of why the drop in
lending by Texas banks had no perceptible effect on subsequent eco-
nomic activity was that Texas-based customers who wanted credit could
find it elsewhere, from bank and nonbank lenders based outside the state.
In the current circumstance, bank lending has been curtailed throughout
the country, not just in New England, suggesting that customers in New
England and elsewhere would have had a tougher time finding credit
than Texas-based borrowers did in the mid 1980s. While certainly not as
intense as it was during the Great Depression, when thousands of banks
failed and thereby interrupted the bank intermediation process for many
borrowers (Bernanke 1983), the recent contraction of bank lending
appears to have had some of the same effects.
In short, it appears that the tougher regulatory policy stance toward
the depository industry has worsened the recession and inhibited the
recovery, although this writer is not prepared to say by how much.
Probably we will never know. Whether the more stringent regulatory policy
was wrong is an entirely different and more complicated matter. As will
be discussed in the concluding section, the answer--looking both
backward and forward to the transition ahead--depends very much on
one’s faith in the likelihood that appropriately stimulative macroeco-
nomic policies would have been (and will be) implemented to offset the
contractionary effects of bank regulatory policies that, with a couple of
exceptions, are basically in the long-term interest of promoting a safe
and sound banking system.
Regulation of Bank Real Estate Activities:
The Long-Run Agenda
In comparison to the first two questions, the third question--
namely, the appropriate long-run strategy for regulation of bank real
estate lending--is an easy one to answer, and one whose broad contours
already have been suggested. The answer comes in two parts, one
addressed to real estate lending directly, and the other to bank lending
and other activities generally.
With respect to real estate lending, it is simply common sense that
banks be held to loan-to-value ratios, requirements that were part of the
statutory framework until 1982. If it is true that such requirements
would have limited the severity of the overbuilding of commercial real
estate in the 1980s, as is argued above, then it follows directly that such
requirements represent sound long-run policy for the 1990s and beyond.
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just proposed re-implementation of loan-to-value ratios that, on bal-
ance, are modestly more restrictive than those in place prior to 1982.
Specifically, the proposal would require loan-to-value ratios at the low
end for raw land (in the 50 to 60 percent range, below the 66.7 percent
limit in the 1982 standards), and at the h!gh end (an 80 to 95 percent
range) for mortgages on residential real estate. The agencies issued their
proposal in response to the 1991 banking reform legislation, which
directed the agencies to adopt uniform real estate lending standards by
September 19, 1992, to be effective by March 19, 1993. To allow for a
transition, the proposed rules would permit lending institutions to
extend loans not conforming to these restrictions in an aggregate
amount of up to 15 percent of the institution’s capital. This proposal
seems eminently reasonable as a long-run objective.
Some analysts have suggested going even further by imposing a
concentration requirement on banks; for example, limiting the propor-
tion of a bank’s assets that can be invested in real estate (or individual
categories of real estate) loans. While there is little doubt that banks that
concentrate excessively in real estate lending may be prone to greater
risk, this writer would be reluctant to support any arbitrary asset
concentration limit, and would prefer to rely on an incentive-based
approach.
Larger banks--specifically those with more than $1 billion in assets,
which are likely to have access to the subordinated debt market--should
be required to meet some portion of their Tier 2 capital requirement by
subordinated (uninsured) debt. Unlike pure equity capital, which banks
can manipulate depending on the levels of loan loss reserves they
establish, subordinated debt outstanding is a hard and definite number.
Holders of subordinated debt also cannot "run" because they are not
entitled to a return of their proceeds until the debt matures, unlike
investors in certificates of deposit who can demand an immediate return
of their funds, albeit with a small penalty. It is for this reason that this
author has always been skeptical of proposals that would cut back the
level of deposit insurance, especially with respect to the larger banks
that, despite the 1991 banking reform legislation, will always be deemed
"too big to fail" (or more precisely, "too big to let uninsured depositors
take a loss").I3
In any event, banks that cannot sell subordinated debt to the
markets will not be able to grow, and thus will be constrained from
investing more heavily in high-risk assets. And one reason the markets
13 Since the enactment of the 1991 reform legislation, which makes it more difficult for
regulators to pay off uninsured depositors, the FDIC has increased the proportion of
failures that it has resolved by not protecting uninsured deposits. The banks that have
been subjected to this treatment are smaller institutions, however, none larger than $1
billion in assets, to my knowledge.210 Robert E. Litan
may not purchase a bank’s subordinated debt is that investors may be
uncomfortable with the levels of its asset concentrations, given its equity
capital. In short, it would be preferable to let sophisticated investors
influence a bank’s asset concentration levels rather than have portfolio
decisions made by regulators, or worse, by legislators.~4
For smaller banks that do not have effective access to the subordi-
nated debt market, excessive concentration in commercial real estate
lending could be restricted in either of two ways without imposing an
arbitrary ceiling. One approach would be to give banks that cross a
certain concentration threshold for high-risk assets a lower supervisory
rating, unless such concentrations were offset with additional capital.
High-risk assets would include not just commercial real estate, but also
LDC loans, loans for highly leveraged transactions, and arguably credit
card loans, which historically have had high charge-off rates. Since the
FDIC’s new risk-based insurance system will be pegged, in part, to
banks’ supervisory ratings, this approach would have the effect of
charging banks higher deposit insurance premia if they concentrate their
investments excessively in high-risk assets. Alternatively, regulators
could directly require banks that cross certain concentration thresholds
to raise additional capital. Under either approach, the requisite concen-
tration criteria would be somewhat arbitrary, but they would not act as
flat limits, which could hamper otherwise useful lending by institutions
with expertise in a field and in locations where such financing is in
heavy demand. An incentive-based approach would be preferable, one
that would encourage banks that want to concentrate in higher-risk
activities to have more capital backing them.
Finally, any long-run regulatory agenda must have clear rules for
loan valuation. This subject will be treated in the following section.
Managing the Transition
While it may be useful to know the direction in which we should be
headed in the long run, bankers and regulators must continue to live in
the short run, and unfortunately it will be painful. A number of analysts
have suggested that real estate prices have hit bottom in key markets,
but many banks are far from out of the woods, on their problem
14 I am fully aware that even the most sophisticated investors can fail to forecast future
bank difficulties, as Richard Randall has documented (1989). Nevertheless, not only do
regulators fail to anticipate all bank problems but in recent years they also have often
engaged in forbearance, allowing banks to grow more rapidly than their weakened
financial conditions would otherwise permit, and which the market itself would not
permit. In short, while investors may not be able to anticipate all asset quality problems,
once those problems have been recognized, they can discipline weakened institutions
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commercial real estate loans in particular. Moreover, it now seems to be
conventional wisdom that in many areas of the country where commer-
cial real estate markets have been especially hard hit in the last several
years--New England, much of the Northeast, and California--the
excess capacity now on the market may not be absorbed for several more
years.15 Indeed, even that forecast may be optimistic. The commercial
vacancy rate in Houston exceeded 20 percent in the spring of 1992, more
than five years after the collapse of the real estate market there.16
More broadly, the economy continues to recover from the 1990-91
recession at a very sluggish pace. Since hitting bottom in the first quarter
of 1991, GDP has grown at an annual rate of less than 2 percent, a pace
clearly insufficient to absorb new workers coming into the labor force.
As a result, the unemployment rate at this writing (7.7 percent) stands
more than 1 full percentage point above the level of the first quarter of
1991 (6.5 percent), when the recession supposedly "ended" (the last
quarter when GDP actually fell).
Meanwhile, the financial system appears unwilling or unable to
encourage a faster recovery. In particular, despite apparent efforts by
the Federal Reserve to expand the money supply, the growth of M2 and
M3 has been at the floor of the Fed’s target ranges for more than two
years now, surely in part because of banks’ unwillingness to make loans
and to bid for deposits, both in an effort to build capital ratios.~7 Even so,
short-term interest rates have dropped steeply, but with little apparent
stimulative effect. In the vernacular used by many economists, the Fed
seems to be pushing on a string. It may be the case, of course, that the
full effects of the most recent easing of rates (generated during the
summer of 1992) will not show up until early 1993. Nevertheless, rates
have been coming down for over 18 months at this writing, and yet
annual GDP growth has continued to be disappointing and slower than
the rate expected by most economic forecasters.
Against this background of slow growth, a growing chorus has
been urging that bank regulators relax both their capital standards and
their loan valuation methods in order to help jump-start the economy by
encouraging bank lending, to smaller businesses in particular. Advo-
15 See, for example, the views of David Shulman of Salomon Brothers, quoted in
Quint (1992).
16 See "Still Flat On Its Back," The Economist, May 16, 1992, p. 103. The article reported
the vacancy rate for downtown Los Angeles to be even higher, at 25.2 percent. Other
major cities---including Chicago, Boston, and New York--also reported vacancy rates in
the 20 percent range.
17 In particular, the Fed’s target range for the growth of M2 in 1991 and 1992 has been
2.5 percent to 6.5 percent, but in actuality, M2 grew by only 3 percent in 1991 and was
advancing at a 3.5 percent pace through April 1992. Similarly, the target range for M3
growth was I to 5 percent in both 1991 and 1992, yet M3 grew by only 1.4 percent in 1991
and through April was climbing at an annual rate of just 0.7 percent in 1992.212 Robert E. Litan
cares of this position point to the limited effectiveness of easier monetary
policy as well as to political and economic reasons why additional fiscal
stimulus would not be appropriate. That leaves the relaxation of bank
regulatory policy as perhaps the only other tool of macroeconomic
stimulus left. It is little wonder, therefore, that economic officials in the
Bush Administration have been pushing such an approach as the
Presidential election nears.
As will be discussed shortly, a number of the criticisms that have
been advanced with respect to loan valuation have merit, independent
of short-run concerns about the pace of the recovery. However, this
writer remains skeptical of proposals to relax or delay the effectiveness
of the capital standards, which took a number of years to negotiate
internationally and which are important to deter abuses of the moral
hazard incentives built into deposit insurance. Indeed, the United States
has about as much moral authority to urge the rest of the world to relax
or defer the implementation of bank capital standards--after witnessing
the highest rates of bank and thrift failures in the world---as we have to
urge the rest of the world to run larger budget deficits (where we have
also been "pioneers").
But all this does not mean policymakers are helpless. It simply
means that the traditional tools of macroeconomic policy must be used
more aggressively than otherwise, not only to offset the contractionary
effect of the much needed return to capital-based discipline, but also to
stimulate the recovery. For example, the reluctance of banks to bid for
deposits or to lend them out has dramatically reduced the ability of the
Fed to encourage economic activity by stimulating new lending through
the traditional multiplier process. Instead, easier money now seems to
"work" principally by lowering the interest costs of borrowers and
thereby freeing up income for other purposes. But this effect, which is
akin to a tax cut, has been offset by weakness elsewhere in the economy,
especially in nonresidential fixed investment (which fell by more than
7 percent in 1991) and state and federal government purchases (which
dropped 1.5 percent in 1991).
At this writing, short-term interest rates have fallen sharply, to the
3 percent range. Since evidence continues that banks are curtailing their
lending, the Fed should continue easing. Given the larger spread
between effective lending rates to small to medium-sized businesses and
market interest rates, the Fed must push market rates down further than
they otherwise would in order to achieve a given degree of stimulus. At
one time, the main argument against further easing was that investors
would view it as inflationary and bid up long rates, counteracting the
effect of the intended stimulus. But the weak economy has put a lid on
inflation, so this standard objection to monetary easing should not apply.
Others nevertheless may worry that even lower rates would help
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battered that central banks have intervened to keep it from falling
further. Nothing is wrong, however, with an even lower dollar, which
would help boost exports. The critical question is whether further easing
would provoke a speculative run on the dollar, thus laying the ground-
work for a subsequent, self-defeating increase in interest rates. Such
claims are doubtful; the bogeyman of the "’dollar strike" has been raised
for several years running, with no evidence that such a strike is
imminent. Indeed, both short and long rates have had no trouble falling
even while the dollar has been falling (precisely what should be
expected as rates fall).
All this does not mean, however, that policymakers should be
content to rely on monetary easing alone to speed the recovery. The
limited effectiveness of lower interest rates thus far suggests a need for
a macroeconomic insurance policy, and specifically for some short-run
fiscal stimulus. My own preference would be for the federal govern-
ment to provide, for up to two years, another $30 billion or so---roughly
0.5 percent of GDP-- to the states and localities (distributed on the basis
of population) to help finance infrastructure spending and to minimize
the need for contractionary tax increases by these governments to close
their budget shortfalls. Any fiscal stimulus should be strictly temporary
and coupled with concrete deficit-reducing measures designed to take
effect automatically in the "out years" (say, beginning in 1994). This
writer’s personal preferences for deficit reduction include further cuts in
defense expenditures and tax increases on energy, but the policy mix is
not as important as getting the structural deficit down in the long run in
order to bolster the nation’s anemic savings rate. Moreover, unless
any temporary fiscal easing is coupled with clear and definite deficit-
reducing measures in the long run, policymakers run a significant risk
that investors will bid up long-term interest rates, fearing that the
short-run increases in the deficit represent harbingers of worse things to
come.
At this writing, the prospects for a fiscal stimulus package like the
one just outlined are somewhat remote. Thus, for those who remain
skeptical that further monetary easing will prove beneficial, the temp-
tation is great to turn back to easing bank regulatory policies as the only
macroeconomic policy tool left. Again, for reasons already mentioned, it
would not be wise to ease bank capital standards for this purpose.
Several policy changes could have some of the stimulative effects the
critics of recent bank regulatory policy so desire, without at the same
time significantly compromising the prudent regulatory objectives of
safety and soundness. Put another way, a number of regulatory changes
that take account of expected cyclical difficulties are nevertheless desir-
able as permanent features of the bank regulatory landscape; they are
not advanced with the objective of making bank regulatory policy itself
an instrument of countercyclical macroeconomic policy.214 Robert E. Litan
First, the risk-weighting system of the current capital standards
should be revamped; as already discussed, it provides an unduly strong
incentive for banks to invest in government securities, which have a
zero risk weight versus the 100 percent that applies to conventional
business and consumer loans. Ideally, much of the risk-weighting
system of the Basle Accord would be scrapped; the risk weights are
highly arbitrary, they lump together a basket of conventional loans with
widely different risks, and they fail to take account of portfolio, liquidity,
and interest rate risks, which may be more important than the asset-
specific risks the standards attempt to recognize. The only significant
feature of the Basle standards that represents a real advance is the
inclusion of off-balance-sheet risks in the capital scheme.
It is, of course, politically unrealistic even to attempt a major
reworking of the Basle standards, which could require several more
years of negotiation. Instead, the United States might ask its G-10
partners who agreed to the standards for a waiver procedure, whereby
individual countries would have the freedom to change the risk weights
so long as the changes do not significantly affect the overall total of bank
capital being required. Thus, such a waiver could allow the U.S.
regulators to narrow the current risk-weighting differential between the
capital required for government securities and the capital required for
conventional loans--say, by raising the risk weight on government
securities to 30 percent, while lowering it on certain .loans (standard
consumer and commercial) to 80 percent. Note that such a procedure
would not represent a weakening of the capital standards, but instead a
realignment that would reduce current disincentives banks now have to
make loans. To be sure, changing the risk weights would have no effects
on the investment decisions of those banks whose capital is constrained
by the leverage ratio (unweighted capital to assets), but most banks are
not constrained in that fashion and thus would have stronger incentives
to make loans if their loans were not so heavily "taxed" by the current
risk weights.
Second, regulators should discontinue the practice of requiring
banks to establish reserves on performing loans before they become
nonperforming, solely on the basis of valuations of the market values of
the underlying collateral. It is true that once real estate values begin to
fall, the risk of nonpayment rises, but attempting to anticipate that risk
with arbitrary reserving decisions can become a self-fulfilling prophecy,
causing bank capital and thus lending to shrink; this in turn can
negatively affect real estate values.18 In such an environment of limited
credit and only a few liquidation-induced transactions, the market prices
on "comparable sales" certainly are not representative of the long-run
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values of many properties. When regulators nevertheless automatically
mark down performing loans based on such comparable values, they are
injecting their own judgment--not necessarily that of the thinly traded
market--about the likelihood of default. A more objective policy that
requires additional reserves only once a loan truly becomes nonperform~
ing would be preferable.
Of course, by now any alteration of the "performing nonperforming
loan" rules would do little to help New England: the horse is already out
of the barn. But the revision could be of some use in minimizing any
further deterioration in banking markets like California, where signifi-
cant real estate problems have surfaced.
Nevertheless, of far greater potential importance are the standards
for valuation--and thus for establishing reserves--on loans that have
become nonperforming and where real estate serves as collateral. The
U.S. Department of the Treasury and other bank regulators instructed
their examiners in December 1991 to use prudent but realistic assess-
ments of the long-run economic values of these properties, based on
present discounted values of the projected revenues that they should
earn. As anyone who is familiar with such projection techniques knows,
even minor changes in key assumptions--notably the discount rate,
vacancy rates, rent inflation levels--can have dramatic effects on the
outcome. The examiners in the field should be instructed to take the
long view when doing these projections (or reviewing those made by
the banks), but also should be firmly instructed not to use liquidation
values in setting reserves on nonperforming loans.
Critics of such a suggestion, of course, may point to the failure of
banks and their regulators to insist on larger reserves for LDC debt at a
much earlier time, based on the depressed market values for such loans.
That failure, in turn, allowed many of the larger banks to grow more
rapidly than was prudent and to devote their incremental deposits to
such high-risk assets as commercial real estate loans. Would a refusal to
base reserving decisions on real estate loans not lead to a similar
problem?
In brief, the answer is no, for a couple of reasons. No one is
questioning the need for reserves on nonperforming real estate loans;
the critical issue is whether prices on thinly traded properties should be
the basis for those decisions. For real estate, which is inherently a
longer-term investment, they should not. Even the market prices of
LDC debt and its high-risk successor, junk bonds, have recovered
substantially from their lows of several years earlier, indicating how
short-term liquidation prices can provide misleading signals regarding
long-term valuation.
In essence, bank regulators recognized this tendency by not re-
quiring banks to reserve earlier and in substantial ways for LDC debt,
even after the loans became nonperforming. It now appears to be216 Robert E, Litan
conventional wisdom in some quarters that this forbearance "worked,"
because all of the larger banks that were heavily extended to the LDCs,
with the exception of Continental Illinois, seem to have recovered from
their brush with disaster. However, the policy had its drawbacks as
well, since it was not accompanied by regulatory measures designed to
limit the growth of these capital-weak institutions. The absence of
such regulations allowed many of the banks to gamble by investing in
commercial real estate, which may yet prove to be an even bigger
financial headache.
This is not a recommendation that regulators pursue the same
valuation and regulatory policies with respect to commercial real estate
as was done for LDC debt. First, such loans that are nonperforming
should have reserves, but those reserves should not be based on
liquidation values. Second, a subordinated debt requirement will ensure
that the largest institutions at least will not be able to grow unless and
until the market believes that their problem loans are under control, or
the banks have been sufficiently recapitalized. But by not using liquida-
tion values as a basis for reserving--which the market itself almost
certainly does not use--regulators would avoid imposing an excessive
degree of stringency on all depositories with significant commercial real
estate exposures.
Finally, given the existing glut of commercial space, absolutely no
justification can be presented for exempting new commercial real estate
loans from the loan-to-value ratios recently proposed by the bank
regulators. But special concern is warranted for residential construction
loans, since residential housing investment traditionally has been critical
to economic recovery from recession. Although gross residential invest-
ment accounts for only about 4 to 5 percent of GDP, during the recovery
phases of recent recessions the growth in such investment has accounted
for a much larger fraction of the growth in output: 22 percent from 1975
to 1977 (the first two years after the 1973-75 recession) and 19 percent
from 1982 to 1984 (the first two years following the 1980-82 recession).
At this writing, however, the growth of residential construction has
been very weak. Regulators should therefore allow reduced risk-weight-
ings on construction loans for residences that have been pre-sold, while
putting the required loan-to-value ratio near or at the top of the
proposed range of 65 to 80 percent.BANKS AND REAL ESTATE: REGULATING THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE 217
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Robert R. Glauber*
In his comprehensive review of the real estate lending activities of
banks during the 1980s, Robert Litan analyzes whether regulatory
action, and bank reaction to it, have exacerbated the current economic
downturn by restricting bank lending. In short, has there been a credit
crunch? Litan’s answer is a grudging "yes." Litan also proposes a
number of regulatory changes in the treatment of real estate, which he
believes could have reduced the excess of bank lending in the 1980s and
for that and other reasons should be adopted. It is on these two issues
in Litan’s paper that these comments will be focused.
Credit Crunch
There is little question but that banks have curtailed lending
activities since 1989. Litan cites numbers on the sluggish growth of bank
assets since 1989, as well as the marked increase in the relative level of
securities holdings. At issue is whether the slowdown in the growth of
assets and loans has been driven mainly by a lack of demand for credit
from creditworthy borrowers, or mainly by a reduction in the willing-
ness of banks to lend to creditworthy borrowers at reasonable prices.
The regulators can be blamed only if the pressure comes mainly from the
supply side.
Litan admits that the evidence is ambiguous at best, but appears to
come down on the side of supply restrictions, due at least in part to
regulatory pressure. His evidence is mainly anecdotal. What hard
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evidence is available strikes me as very much on the other side; that is,
that most of the reduction in loan growth is due .to an easing of demand,
as would be expected-in a recession. While regional differences exist
and, in New England particularly, bank reluctance probably explains
somewhat more of the lending slowdown, it is hard to accept this as the
explanation nationwide.
A principal reason for being skeptical of the argument that banks
are responsible for the lending slowdown is that other nonbank,
unregulated sources of short-term business lending have shown reduc-
tions in growth and even absolute declines in 1991. Finance company
lending, a major source of funds to small business, after growing at a
12.6 percent annual rate during the period from 1988 to 1990, grew only
0.8 percent in 1991.1 Funds raised by nonfinancial businesses through
commercial paper actually contracted by 15.7 percent in 1991, after
growing at a 16.6 percent annual rate over the previous three years.
While commercial paper is generally not available to smaller businesses,
which rely principally on bank loans, the contraction in this source is
indicative of general reductions in the demand for funds throughout the
economy.
Another piece of striking evidence against a credit crunch comes
from surveys of small businesses, the principal victims of any bank-
driven credit restrictions. The April 1992 survey by the National
Federation of Independent Business, based on questionnaires com-
pleted by over 2,000 of its member firms, states unequivocally: "Financ-
ing difficulties were named by just 4% as the most important problem.
Nope, no CREDIT CRUNCH" (capitalization in original). (For what
it is worth, regulation and taxes tied for first at 23 percent.) For
completeness, it is worth noting that this indicator has been in the 5 to
7 percent range nationally over the past two years and 7 to 11 percent in
New England. By comparison, in the 1980-82 period, when most
observers would agree there really was a credit crunch, the index rose to
36 percent.
In the end it is hard to read a definitive answer to the credit crunch
question from the data. Obviously no one would seriously argue that
the cause is wholly demand or supply-side forces. But the data strike me
as hardly compatible with the conclusion that the systematic refusal of
banks to lend to creditworthy customers pervasively caused the slow-
down in loan growth.
i These figures and those in the rest of this paragraph are derived from the Federal
Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds Accounts, Fourth Quarter, 1991.220 Robert R. Glauber
Regulatory Changes
Litan’s most interesting regulatory proposals are to reintroduce
explicit loan-to-value ratios for real estate lending, to require large banks
to issue subordinated debt as part of their capital, to develop standards
that would focus on long-term value rather than liquidation value in
appraising real estate collateral, and to reduce the current bias in the
risk-based capital standards in favor of government securities and
against commercial and industrial loans.
The proposals for subordinated debt and the use of long-term
valuation in appraisals are eminently sensible, in my view. Any attempt
to reintroduce market discipline--as would happen with subordinated
debt--should be encouraged in an industry where deposit insurance has
removed much of it. But I would not be too optimistic about the disciplin-
ary effect of subordinated debt. With insured deposits still available to a
bank, it will most likely simply turn to the government’s balance sheet
through brokered deposits when its own balance sheet becomes so weak
that the cost of subordinated debt rises unacceptably. This is in fact what
Citicorp did in mid 1991. Nevertheless, subordinated debt provides a
market "early warning system" and should be encouraged.
While generally in sympathy with most of the remaining regulatory
changes Litan proposes, I view a reinstallation of explicit loan-to-value
ratios for real estate lending as both wrong policy on its own and a
reflection of a misguided direction in regulatory structure. First, it is
worth noting that, while the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) mandates that the regulators adopt
real estate lending guidelines and standards, it in no way requires that
they promulgate explicit loan-to-value restrictions.
The fundamental issue raised by these proposals is whether the
banking regulatory structure should further evolve in the direction of a
centrally orchestrated system of detailed restrictions on banks, a system
that would increasingly replace the presently functioning, diverse
structure of standards developed by the banks themselves. Banks face
complex lending decisions and develop complex, varied control systems
to avoid exposing shareholders to inordinate risks. These systems by
and large are sensible and effective, although their effectiveness is
perhaps limited by a failure of the banks to always apply the systems
consistently. I am skeptical that a centrally developed structure created
by the regulators will be superior.
It likely will be argued in rebuttal that the proposed loan-to-value
system is but one simple addition to the banks’ own self-regulatory
structures. But it is almost certain that the regulators will find it
necessary to further elaborate the simple list of loan-to-value ratios in
order to deal with complicated specific cases: for example, construction
loans with recourse; loans subject to sale within one, two, or threeDISCUSSION 221
months; loans collateralized by specific kinds of real estate, like timber-
lands. Indeed, Litan in his paper would make a regulatory exemption to
the capital standards for construction loans on pre-sold homes. I fear
this path inevitably leads to the evolution of a mountain of regulations,
slow to respond to innovations in the marketplace and potentially
stifling of bank vitality and creativity.
Moreover, the danger exists that regulatory standards designed to
constrain bank real estate risk will in fact have the opposite effect. What
are developed as upper limits on aggressive lending can easily meta-
morphose into safe harbor protections. If, for example, 70 percent is the
prescribed limit on commercial real estate construction loans, a loan at
65 percent of value is difficult for the regulators to challenge even if other
aspects of the loan make it unduly risky.
Real estate lending was the bank problem of the mid and late 1980s
across the board, as Litan demonstrates. But one can be pretty certain
the next major banking crisis will not be caused by real estate (even if
banks ever do start making real estate loans again). This obsessive
attention to real estate lending has much the image of fighting the last
war. The next crisis will come from another direction--energy loans,
agriculture loans, swaps, or somewhere else. And after that horse is out
of the barn, if we follow this trend to microregulation, we will have
another rule book of detailed restrictions dealing with the most recent
problem assets.
Finally, harking back to a question Litan posed in his paper, would
loan-to-value ratios have significantly contributed to avoiding the bank
real estate problems of the 1980s? If the real estate excesses had simply
been the consequence of pervasively poor loan underwriting, perhaps
loan-to-value ratios could have played an important, beneficial role,
although I have concerns that the cure might be worse than the disease.
But clearly the real estate problems of the eighties were much more the
consequence of a rapid asset inflation, followed by an equally rapid asset
deflation. (55 Water Street, New York, one of the "jewels" in Olympia
& York’s U.S. crown, is today worth perhaps 30 percent of its peak
value.) How well would loan-to-value ratios operate to hold back the
flood in such an economic environment? Surely, at least at levels that
would still permit a healthy level of lending activity, loan-to-value ratios
could not effectively protect against asset inflation. Loans made as prices
were rising would meet the standards at the time they were made. And
without some dynamic, mark-to-market process in the implementation
of the standards, loan-to-value ratios are unlikely to operate as an
effective impediment to the excesses Litan has documented.2 Such
2 Such a dynamic application of loan-to-value ratios would in fact engender the same
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restrictions might work to prevent poor evaluation of specific assets, but
they cannot be very effective in a world of boom and (unforeseen) bust
in real estate prices.
What is a reasonable alternative to the reimposition of loan-to-value
ratios? Certainly a strong sense exists that bank regulation did not work
in the eighties and that something different is needed. That is the view
of Congress implicit in FDICIA. But Congress, with at least some
wisdom, did not require microregulations such as loan-to-value ratios.
An alternative road to more intrusive regulation would be to have
regulators promulgate a set of standards, which could be used as a
template by examiners in evaluating the institutions’ own policies and
their implementation. Regulatory standards would focus more on an
institution’s policies rather than on the specifics of its loans. This would
surely require more judgment by examiners than the checklist approach
toward which we are evolving, but it would also reduce the risk that the
regulators will increasingly stifle the creativity and vitality of the
banking system.
Ultimately, the path to revitalizing the banking industry lies not in
more restrictive regulations to prevent bank mistakes, but in reducing
the needless restrictions that limit the range of profitable opportunities
open to banks. Banks have the almost unlimited ability to raise funds
from the markets (using as necessary the government’s guarantee), but
confront limited opportunities to put this money to work profitably at
acceptable risk levels. This "excess capacity" leads inevitably to banks
seeking out riskier investment opportunities. Litan seems to agree with
this diagnosis.
What is surely needed is the removal of the outdated restrictions
that constrain where banks can conduct their activities and what types
of securities activities they can engage in. Congress would have served
the public interest far better if it had accepted the Bush Administration’s
proposals to repeal the interstate banking restrictions of the McFadden
Act and the securities activity restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act,
instead of mandating the plethora of microregulatory initiatives in
FDICIA as it was passed.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 1991. Flow of Funds Accounts, Fourth
Quarter.
National Federation of Independent Business. 1992. "Quarterly Economic Report for Small
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Sherman J. Maisel*
Since I agree with a great deal of what Robert Litan says, I shall not
analyze his paper in detail. Rather, I shall emphasize the areas where I
disagree or where I think his ideas can be supplemented.
I believe his historical analysis is correct. The tremendous increase
in bank lending for construction and development and on commercial
property was primarily the result of animal spirits lemming-like be-
havior. Losses would have been reduced through proper regulatory
actions.
The amazing aspect of banks’ rapid loan expansion is that it took
place after 1985, when the large losses suffered by savings and loan
institutions on such loans already were well recognized. Clearly, many
bankers thought they were being cautious and making only sound
loans. They were aware of dangers but failed to forecast them accu-
rately. What they did not recognize was the great institutional bias in
real estate financing toward extreme cyclical behavior.
The High Cyclical Risks in Real Estate Lending
The high risks inherent in construction, development, and commer-
cial loans are well known. In every year’s surveys of loan losses, they
show up as one of the top risk categories. But the losses are multiplied
many times in a recession. Numerous factors can explain real estate’s
amplified booms and busts.
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1. The period between the time when a loan is made and the time
when it is paid off is much longer in real estate than in most other
fields. Values depend on future, not current, supply and de-
mand.
2. Because properties are large, durable, and expensive, their
ownership normally requires an outside source of funds. As a
result, the availability and cost of financing play a major role in
determining property values. When the amount of money made
available by lenders expands or contracts, prices move up or
down. This occurs even if construction or user costs remain
constant.
3. Collateral values are based on appraisals that are notoriously
poor. Appraisals reflect primarily what has happened in the
market in the past. When sales have been dominated by a herd
mentality, appraisals use the resulting high prices as the basis for
current valuations. Any shifts in expectations cause wide varia-
tions in future values and prices.
4. While construction and development loans are made for a
considerably shorter period, their dangers are even greater. In
most cases, current cash flows are low or nonexistent. Interest
payments are pre-funded. No one knows what prices can be
achieved until the buildings or lots are completed. During the
construction period, supply can expand far too fast, as compet-
itors rush to fill the previously observed demand.
5. The risks in real estate financing are extremely hard to quantify.
In normal periods, they are underestimated. The distributions,
as in many financial situations, tend to be highly skewed.
Extreme losses occur, but infrequently enough to be forgotten in
normal times. The risk distributions shift often as a result of
expectations, interest changes, or large movements in supply
and demand.
Given the large risks, their skewed distributions, and the difficulties
in quantifying them, I agree that special regulatory attention should be
paid to real estate lending. The difficulty arises in devising the most
efficient regulatory rules.
The objectives of regulating real estate, as with other lending, are:
1. To decrease the likelihood that banks will endanger their future
by an overconcentration in excessively risky loans.
2. To decrease the tendency of banks to make their loans pro-
cyclically. Overexpansions of lending are expensive both for
banks and for the economy. They lead first to excess and then to
too little investment.
3. To allow a more efficient correction of past errors. Regulations
should give banks the incentives and the time to choose the bestDISCUSSION 225
way out of a bad situation. Banks are often better off recasting
loans rather than foreclosing. Debtors may be willing to add
some funds. They may be able to manage and market the
property more profitably. However, banks must be certain that
they get their fair share of any cash flow. Since the debtor usually
has little or no equity, problems of moral hazard are great. If a
bank has to foreclose, it should not be forced to liquidate in an
untimely manner.
Regulatory Relaxation
A second theme of the Litan paper is whether or not regulatory
relaxation is a proper tool of antirecessionary policy. As regulators
realize only too well, the demand for regulatory relaxation appears in all
recessions. The shift of bank assets toward securities rather than loans
also is a regular cyclical phenomenon. It certainly reflects a shift in
demand for loans. It probably also reflects a reestimation by lenders of
the risks and profitability of certain types of loans.
It is also clear that regulatory relaxation or forbearance can be
dangerous. We know that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the
Administration, and the Congress thought that forbearance made sense
for savings and loans from 1980 to 1984. Regulations were relaxed by the
introduction of regulatory accounting principles, the reduction of net
worth requirements, and an increase in lending powers. The relaxation
turned out to be disastrous.
Suggestions as to regulatory forbearance include both lower loss
reserves and a delay in liquidating assets. It is assumed that delaying the
liquidation of foreclosed properties will help the asset holder as well as
the market and the economy. In contrast, many economists have
argued--incorrectly, I believe--that the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration and the Resolution Trust Corporation have been too slow in
closing institutions and selling their assets. They claim that the costs of
holding assets far exceed any gains that could be obtained through a
delay in liquidation.
In considering this topic, one should recall one of the earliest
studies of the problem--John Lintner’s study of the results of the
performance of Massachusetts savings banks in the Great Depression
(Lintner 1948). His results have been used as another argument against
forbearance. He found that book losses became larger after the worst of
the Depression was over. The longer loans were held, the greater the
losses. What remains ambiguous is whether losses would have been
greater or smaller if they had tried to liquidate earlier. Obviously, those
operating at the time thought they were taking the more profitable226 Sherman J. Maisel
action by delaying foreclosures and sales, even though they were later
criticized for doing so.
Possible Forbearance Now
Litan, in contrast, argues that forbearance in general should not be
adopted at the present time. But he does suggest that additional
reserves should not be imposed against performing loans; that loan
reserves should not be based on current or liquidation values; and that
special provisions should be made for housing construction loans.
The need for such relaxations arises from the assumption that
current market prices are incorrect. It is argued that the market overre-
acts. It fails to judge cyclical forces correctly. A lack of liquidity
artificially curtails demand. As a result, both banks and the economy
will gain if regulators do not penalize banks for not foreclosing or for not
selling real estate owned. Not requiring larger reserves will increase
bank capital and add to available credit. Holding properties off the
market will help maintain prices.
As in all issues of regulatory relaxation, the question arises as to
how best to solve a particular problem. Examiners require additional
reserves because the situation has changed. The risks to the bank, its
depositors, and the insurance fund have gone up. Is altering required
loss reserves or delaying liquidation a better way to act so as to minimize
additional costs?
The use of the term "performing nonperforming loans" seems to
point to a contradictory and illogical policy. How can a performing loan
be nonperforming? The situation might be clearer if we spoke of loans
that are currently performing but whose risks have increased sufficiently
to make an additional loss reserve requirement logical.
One obvious source of future problems with performing loans is
found in construction and development advances, where interest has
been pre-funded or where it is probable that the amounts available for
current payments will not suffice to complete a project. Requiring action
now will reduce future losses.
In other cases, it may be clear that a loan based primarily on the
available collateral holds greater risks because the value of that collateral
has dropped. Whether or not action is necessary may depend on a
reanalysis of the underlying credit as well as negotiations with the
debtor. The fact that loans are performing does not mean that reserves
should not be held against them.
What about the idea that examiners finding nonperforming loans
should not base their reserve requirements on liquidation values, but
instead should use "realistic assessments of the long-run economic
values of these properties, based on present discounted values of theDISCUSSION 227
projected revenues that they should earn"? As a corollary, it would
seem that a similar rule should be applied to real estate owned. Why
should properties be liquidated at less than their values?
In attempting to follow such advice, bankers and examiners must
determine whether appraisals that show the present value of future
income greater than current market prices are correct. Anyone who has
used many appraisals must be extremely dubious about using appraised
valuations to replace those of the market. Such caution will be reinforced
by reading a 1992 paper by Hendershott and Kane, which shows how
far off appraisals were in recent years from values based on more
realistic assumptions.
Appraisals, by their nature, can tell only what past market values
have been. Even such judgments become dubious if the number of
recent comparable sales is small or if many adjustments are needed to
arrive at comparability. Discount (or capitalization) rates used by ap-
praisers merely reflect the relationships between past values and future
projected income. When people try to substitute discount rates other
than those found in the market, they assume that their knowledge is
better than that of those who are actively trading. Why should this be
true? To be more accurate, the substitute values must be based on a
clearer vision of future income or expenses, or of what prices would be
in the current market if it were not subject to liquidation pressures.
Anyone trying to find equilibrium values for reserve or liquidity
decisions would perhaps be better off using the appraisal concept of
replacement cost. It would make clear the hazardous assumptions
necessary in attempting to measure equilibrium values. The problems
are similar to those in the use of discounted cash flow procedures.
To arrive at values through this method, we must find the current
replacement cost of a property. This amount must be reduced by the loss
in value due to physical or functional depreciation as well as the present
value of the losses from excess vacancies and reduced rents between
now and the time equilibrium is reached. Needed are projections of
current costs and how they will change; the point when equilibrium will
be reached; the real depreciation at that time (what the level of rents and
expenses will be); how far below equilibrium income will be in the
interim; plus proper discount rates for the lost income.
The main advantage of the replacement cost technique is that it is
based on the more easily estimated current costs and income plus a
discount rate. It still requires projections of the point when equilibrium
will be reached and of income between now and then.
With respect to the view that reduced risk-weighting should be
allowed on construction and development loans, I believe this also is not
too logical. The determination of risk should be as accurate as possible
and then should be maintained. In the past, construction and develop-
ment loans have used various forms of credit enhancement from228 Sherman J. Maisel
specialists to reduce the risks to banks. Since banks have often failed in
estimating the risks of such loans, this appears to be a logical division of
functions. If bank regulations are altered, it becomes harder for others to
perform such functions. All may be better off if the regulations are
maintained.
Rather than try to make ad hoc regulatory adjustments to the cycle,
as envisaged by such proposals, I believe we would be better off revising
the regulations so that they include proper cyclical relationships in their
basic structure.
The Long-Run Agenda
In addition to his discussion of the past and the present, Litan
suggest several policies for the future. He believes that the new, stricter
maximum loan-to-value ratios proposed by the regulators are sensible.
He would require large banks to borrow on subordinate debt if they
want to expand their assets. The objective is to require the market’s
scrutiny and approval of the bank’s operations when it wants to grow.
For smaller banks, he would measure their concentration in a broad
class of riskier loans, of which real estate loans would be a major
element. If this seemed excessive, he would require either a lower
examination rating, and therefore greater scrutiny and higher insurance
premiums, or a higher required capital-asset ratio.
While requiring subordinated debt in order to bring about some
outside scrutiny makes sense, I do not see it as a strong tool to halt the
undue expansion of real estate loans. They can grow and have grown as
a result of a shift in lending within a static total. They can expand even
though a bank would not need to borrow additional capital.
The second proposal, to penalize but not prohibit an undue
concentration of loans, seems sensible and should be applied to all
banks. The penalties could increase together with the amount of
concentration on riskier loans.
To Litan’s suggested changes, I would propose two additions:
1. Regulations could require an early warning system to guard
against too rapid growth of any appreciable asset category. Many bank
failures result from expanding particular types of loans too fast. Such
growth often reflects the herd instinct. When bankers rush to make one
type of loan that Seems especially profitable, a catch probably exists. The
potential excess profitability is likely to mean that something has been
left out of the analysis. Other problems arise. A sudden rapid growth
usually requires the use of loan officers who lack required skills. In
addition, experience shows that diversification over time, as well as in
other dimensions, is a requirement of a sound portfolio policy. A sharp
increase in one type of loan means that such diversification is missing.DISCUSSION 229
In the warning system, a flag might be raised any time a quarterly
regulatory report showed an annual growth rate in any appreciable asset
class (including major industries) of more than some selected rate, such
as over 15 percent. Alternatively, a flag might also go up if the growth
exceeded some percentage of the bank’s capital---say 10 or 20 percent.
Such a warning would require both management and the regulators
to examine the rapidly growing class of assets in greater detail. An
underwriting review independent of the loan officers might be required.
The examiners would have to comment specifically on the reasons for
and quality of the growth. The analysis would be incorporated into the
bank’s rating.
2. A second approach to the problems raised by the cyclical action
of real estate and other types of lending would be to allow the
capital-asset ratio of banks to vary with the business and lending cycle.
Instead of assuming that the minimum level of capital should be the
same at all times, perhaps minimum capital asset ratios should rise as
the economy expands and decline in recessions.
While the average ratios might be higher than now contemplated,
the lowest minimums would still give the necessary protection. The
increase in capital requirements as the economy expanded would
require that greater attention be paid to the long-run profitability of any
rapidly growing lending sphere. The lower minimums in a recession
would remove some of the pressure toward cumulative liquidations.
Such a cyclical change in reserve requirements would mean that the
pressure for regulatory relaxation could be met, but not at the potential
expense of depositors and the insurance fund. The desired flexibility
would be gained through higher requirements during expansions rather
than too slack regulation during recessions.
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